Overcalling a No-Trumper in Auction Bridge

In Which Some Exception Is Taken to One of R. F. Foster's Pet Theories

WILBUR C. WHITEHEAD

IN THE April issue of Vanity Fair, Mr. R. F. Foster discusses the worst bid at Auction Bridge—the overcall, or double, of a no-trumper on the right. Incidentally he attacks all the writers who disagree with him. In the past I have never troubled to answer any of Mr. Foster's fulminations against those to whom he ironically refers as "the authorities". But this article, impugning as it does my colleague, Mr. Work, by name, me by innuendo, Mr. E. K. Leech of the successful and authoritative Auction Bridge Bulletin, and slurring, as it does, the radio games sponsored by the U. S. Playing Card Company, an organization that has done so much for the good of Auction Bridge in America, should not pass without answer.

In his article, Mr. Foster cites several of the Radio Games. He says:

"Of course, it is generally understood that these radio games were never actually played by the persons whose names are attached to them. On page 46, of the Auction Bridge Bulletin for November 1925, it is stated that Mr. E. K. Leech selects the deals and prepares the text, in which he docs the vicarious thinking for the players. After the two leading 'authorities', that take part in every hand, have looked this over and approved it as the kind of bridge they would like to be able to play, it is broadcast as an example to ordinary persons of how much they have to learn.

"I played in one of these hands myself, broadcast February 16th, in which I am credited with making a little slam which I am sure I never would have made in actual play. ... If four experts would sit down and play an actual game, and broadcast just as they did it, some of the results would be infinitely consoling to many, who would soon discover that these authorities are human, after all."

Later Mr. Foster uses such phrases as "The play of the hand is, of course, fixed up so that . . ." and "The hand apparently fixed up to illustrate the convention that . . ."

NOW the radio hands cannot be described as being "fixed up". If they were "fixed up" they would be made fool-proof against the extraordinary defenses proposed by Mr. Foster to defeat their object. They are selected by Mr. Leech, to whom is entrusted the vast amount of clerical work necessary, from hundreds of hands drawn from the Duplicate games at the Knickerbocker, Cavendish, and other card clubs, and from hands actually played elsewhere, contributed by such eminent experts as Sidney S. Lenz, Ralph J. Lcibendcrfer, E. V. Shepard, Gratz M. Scott, as well as by Mr. Work and myself. Some few are taken from Mr. Work's Par Auction series and other books, but these hands were likewise originally selected from a large number of deals taken from actual play.

The hands chosen all contain more than one instructive point, and the opportunities for the coufs which they contain arise through normal and correct play and not through fortuitous errors.

There are no trumps and Z leads. Y and Z want six tricks. How do they get them? Answer in the July number

The hands illustrate the kind of bridge that is actually played, as well as the kind of bridge "we would like to play". Most of the brilliant coufs broadcasted in these games were actually executed by the original players. For example, the hand which Mr. Foster says was "fixed up" for Mr. Work's "brilliant finesse" was actually played by Mr. Work in a tournament at Saranac Inn. Of course, the four players whose names are attached to each radio game have not actually gathered around a table in the radio room. An invitation to "play on the radio" is simply a courtesy extended to leading auction experts. They participate to this extent: When Mr. Leech has written the text of the game, from the annotations of the contributor of the hand, duplicate copies are sent for approval to all the participants, and any correction a participant may have to make is incorporated, or, if the part assigned him is objectionable to him, the deal is thrown out entirely.

Mr. Foster's article commences with the statement: "After carefully watching and tabulating the bids that lose more than any others at the bridge table, I have come to the conclusion that it is quite unnecessary to change the opinion expressed in the July, 1922, issue of Vanity Fair, to the effect that overcalling a no-trumper, when you have the lead, is the greatest loser in the game."

To all appearances this is a condemnation of overcalling a no-trumper on the right with no more strength than that required to overcall a suit bid—a practice that Mr. Foster is not alone in disapproving. To overcall a no-trump

on the right, unless holding a probable game with less than average assistance from partner, is suicidal. No player who knows the ABC of auction indulges in such a bid. I applaud Mr. Foster's efforts in this, and in other articles, to disseminate such elementary education.

None of the players to whom Mr. Foster constantly refers in quotes as "the authorities" takes issue with him in the thesis above set forth. But a careful reading of other articles by Mr. Foster discloses his belief that a player should NEVER overcall or double a no-trumper on the right. This blanket rule we most certainly dispute. I am in entire accord with Mr. Work, that to give Vanity Fair's readers such advice is quite unsound.

Mr. Foster endeavours to substantiate his case by quoting three deals from the Radio Games.

In these three deals he would have the second hand remain silent in the face of the dealer's no trump bid when second hand holds each of the following hands:

EACH of these hands can be expected to go game with average, or less than average, assistance from partner. I should like to ask Mr. Foster: Should a player abandon all idea of trying for game with these hands, merely because a no trump has been bid ahead of him? A player passing any of these hands in such a situation could be justly and severely criticised by his partner.

This is what actually happened in the three hands:

In the first hand, the second hand player bid four hearts over the no-trumper. He made his contract and game, although the no-trumper held 4 1/2 quick tricks, twice the minimum required for a no trump. Mr. Foster would prevent second hand from scoring game by opening trumps. Ingenious as this idea may be from the "double-dummy" standpoint—when all four hands are seen—it was not a lead that would be made by expert players. Deals can always be found in which a bizarre lead would turn out to be the best possible opening. But. for every one such deal, a large number arc wrecked by a blind opening of trumps.

Since game might have been stopped it hearts by a bizarre opening, Mr. Foster argue that the second hand should have passed and led against the no trumper, which he would have set for 130 points. While it is true tha the second hand can be confident of settin the no-trumper, why should he rest content with 50 or 100 points when he himself has every chance of making more points in tricks and honors, and, in addition to that, scoring a gamer?

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It should be noted that, in analyzing these three examples, Mr. Foster takes the duplicate standpoint (only an infinitesimal percentage of all games are played in duplicate) and not that of the regular game. In duplicate, where rubbers are not played, the value of a hand is but 125 for going game, plus honors. Hence, when in doubt as to going game and in no doubt as to setting your opponents, it is usually advisable to take the sure penalty. But, in ordinary rubber play, when the value of a hand can be 250, plus honors, the big winnings at auction result from trying for a game as long as a probability or possibility of a game exists, and accepting no penalties that are not the equivalent, or more than the equivalent, of the value of the game. Hence, Mr. Foster's arithmetic concerning what might have happened is a false and misleading computation when compared with what did happen.

In the second of these Radio Hands, the second hand player doubled, after which his partner made game in spades. The deal was selected as an interesting example of the superiority of the double of a no-trump—where possible—to an immediate overbid, since there was a game possible in spades, but no game in hearts, although the partner of the declarer held Jxx in hearts.

Again, Mr. Foster would defeat the game, in spades, by opening trumps, this time from the K and x. It need hardly be pointed out that the success of this play depends on the intermediates in the hand of the leader's partner, and there are ten possible distributions of the unseen intermediate cards that will make the lead of the spade king fatal, for every one that will make it successful. A very little change in the intermediates would make this lead of the spade king the only lead by which the opponents could present the declarer with a game. In the long run such a lead is obviously bound to lose many more times than it will win. The knowledge that such a bid would produce such a lead would do much to justify the bid in many cases.

Again, since the game might have been defeated—it wasn't, in the actual play—Mr. Foster argues that the second hand should have been content to pass the bid and take the 100 perfectly certain points in penalties.

In the third example, the second hand doubled, and fourth hand made a business pass. The dealer redoubled asking for rescue, and, when third hand rescued with two hearts, the next two players passed. The doubler was now faced with the problem of "Which way to jump" and chose to go two no-trumps. Although the original no-trumper held 3 1/4 quick tricks (considerably better than a minimum no-trumper), the declarer went game, winning 155 points. Mr. Foster would evidently have had him pass, setting the original no-trump for 150 points. Mr. Foster therefore considers that the double of the notrumper was valueless. On the contrary, it was of double value. In rubber play, in the long run the game is of greater value than double its equivalent in penalties. And the double, besides enabling the doubler to get into this game bid, gave him an opportunity to score a greater number of points, for had he chosen to double the two hearts rather than bid two no-trumps, he would have made 200 points, less the honors which he was able to score by bidding.

It will take more than the advice of Mr. Foster to induce good bridge players to surrender all hope of game whenever an adversary on the right bids no-trump. And it will require a much more powerful argument than absurd double-dummy plays to convince a sound bidder that a one notrump bid, on the right, should be sufficiently formidable to frighten him away from game-going, and bigscoring, opportunities.

Since the foregoing was written, I have received a letter from another of the "authorities" constantly scored by Mr. Foster—Mr. Ralph J. Leibenderfer—who says, in the course of his letter:

"Here are three hands that I held in a match last night, and which I bid over an original no-trumps on my right.

"I made four odd in spades but if I had passed, the no-trump bidder would have scored three odd with the spade opening.

"With this hand I doubled one notrump, my partner bid two spades and made four odd. If I had passed and opened spades, I would have saved game but with a heart opening the no-trump bidder would have scored game. The necessity for the double is obvious.

"With this hand I bid two hearts and, when overbid with spades, bid three hearts. When my opponents bid three spades, however, I bid four clubs and was able to score game with clubs as trumps. If I had passed and opened hearts, the no trump bidder would have scored game.

"The foregoing hands are not unusual, but good examples of the type that not only should but must be bid over a no trump on right if the player hopes to get the maximum results."

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ANSWER TO THE MAY BRIDGE PROBLEM

Which Appeared in Conjunction with Mr. R. F. Foster's article.

This was the distribution in Problem LXXXIII:

There are no trumps and Z leads. Y and Z want five tricks against any defense. This is how they get them:

Z starts with the jack of diamonds, upon which A plays the ten. B can discard either heart or spade. Z now leads the spade queen, upon which Y sheds a small heart. Z follows with the four of diamonds which Y wins. When Y leads the jack of clubs, B clucks it. Now B must make the next two tricks %vith a heart and a spade, or two hearts, according to his first discard on the diamqnd, losing a club trick at the end.

The pretty part of this problem lies in the management of the defense by A. If he plays a small diamond to the first trick, Z will lead the spade, upon which Y will discard a club instead of a heart, and, by putting A in with the losing diamond, Y and Z will make six tricks instead of five.

If Z starts with a spade lead, A and B can defeat the solution. Suppose Y discards the club jack to unblock, when Z leads the jack of diamonds, A will drop the ten and when Y wins the next diamond lead B can safely unguard his king of clubs, and win two heart tricks and a spade.

If Z starts with the winning spade, and Y keeps the club jack, discarding a small heart, as in the trunk play, A will keep the ten of diamonds, that card being the key to the whole situation. Now, it is A that will win the second diamond lead, and will return the club, which B will duck, as before.

If Z overtakes the jack he loses a trick to B's king of clubs and lets in the hearts and spades. If the club jack holds, B must make two tricks in hearts and spades, and A has already made a trick in diamonds.